VM i korrupsjon og interessekonflikter

Green Point Stadium
Den sportslige biten av fotball-VM får jo behørig dekning av alle medier. Så jeg tenkte det kunne være litt interessant å se litt mer på den økonomiske biten av mesterskapet. Jeg postet i går en grov oversikt over inntekter og utgifter i forbindelse med VM, og påpekte at det meste av inntektene havner hos FIFA, mens det meste av utgiftene blir båret av sør-afrikanerne.

For å arrange et mesterskap som VM er det store utgifter til infrastruktur og stadium-bygging. Det er ikke alltid de som vedtar hva som skal bygges har landets beste i tankene. Den sør-afrikanske tankesmien Institute for Security Studies (finansiert blant annet av norske oljepenger) har gitt ut rapporten Player and Referee – Conflicting Interests and the 2010 FIFA World Cup (TM). De skriver blant annet:

Om kostnadene:

In the 2010 Annual Budget Speech presented to Parliament, the Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, pointed out: “The 2010 FIFA World Cup is expected to contribute about 0,5 percent of GDP growth in 2010. To date, government has spent about R33 billion (ca NOK28 milliard) in preparation for the tournament.”

Om kostnadsutviklingen:

In 2004, the financial impact report for the South African World Cup bid committee (prepared by Grant Thornton) estimated the cost of infrastructure and stadiums to the taxpayer would be about R2.3 billion. By October 2006 this amount had increased to R8.35 billion. The current estimated costs to the taxpayer of the stadiums and related infrastructure is R17.4 billion (ca NOK15 millard).

Om Green Point Stadium i Cape Town oppsummerer de:

The story of Cape Town’s Green Point stadium aptly illustrates the ongoing tension between the public and the private interest. In chapter six Karen Schoonbee and Stefaans Brümmer eloquently explore how Cape Town came to build a new stadium, although the FIFA inspection committee found that it had other suitable options. They closely examine the decision-making process that led to the outcome, providing the factual basis for an argument that national government was structurally conflicted. Instead of it remaining the neutral arbiter of competing interests, including those of FIFA and the public interest, FIFA’s interests effectively became those of government. Their conclusion that the least desirable and most expensive option was chosen is carefully supported.

Om Moses Mabhida Stadium i Durban:

In chapter seven, Sam Sole continues the public interest theme, questioning whether the Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban represents ‘an arch of hope’ for the city or ‘a yoke of debt’. Although the Durban bid started off as one of the more modest proposals in the South African FIFA 2010 Bid Book, the push by the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government for a new stadium meant that the Moses Mabhida stadium became a highly priced legacy project. Sole argues that while there is no evidence of corruption, the benefits of this new stadium are highly concentrated among big construction firms, empowerment regulars and the local political elite. Yet the costs, both current and future, are high, spread wide and disproportionately affect the poorest citizens of the city.

Som med alle store bygg og anlegg-prosjekter er det store muligheter for korrupsjon og interessekonflikt. Selv i et land som Tyskland gikk ikke VM helt uten sine skandaler. Det er nærliggende å tro at problemene er mye større i Sør-Afrika.

Nå skal man selvsagt ta denne rapporten som et partsinnlegg og ikke som en sannhet. Men interessant lesing er det uansett.

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